That democratic values and democratic
institutions are in crisis all around the world is no longer a revelation;
casual observation of the current global scene is enough to bear this out. For
years, empirical data provided by the Freedom House and the Economist
Intelligence Unit (EIU) in their annual reports have been indicating that
democracy is in a downward spiral. According to a Freedom House report, almost
67 percent people in the world now live under political systems which are
either “not free” or “partly free”, or in other words undemocratic. One-third
of the global population lives in outright authoritarian regimes according to
the EIU, and many Asian countries are hybrid regimes—i.e., ostensibly
democratic but essentially authoritarian.
Academics with impeccable records on tracking
the health of global democracy raised the red flag at the beginning of this
decade. With the gradual fading of the euphoria of democracy's victory after
the end of the Cold War, many researchers and activists alike warned that the
path from authoritarianism does not always end in democracy.
Some called the situation a decline of
democracy, others called it a reverse wave. However it was described, with
increasing numbers of people around the world being under not-free status in
various countries, especially in countries which were previously considered
consolidated democracies, plus the growing challenges to democratic norms and
values from various sources, a consensus has emerged that democracy is in
crisis. A wide range of studies on the causes of and conditions for the plight
of democracy have been published in the past decade. In these studies, and in
public discourse, we can find answers to the questions as to what the decline
looks like and how it happens. But what factors engendered the process remains
an issue of contention.
We know what it looks like when democracy is in
retreat, worse yet, when it is dead: citizens' fundamental rights are severely
curtailed, space for dissent shrinks, institutional protection to opponents of
the government disappear, freedom of expressions and assembly become limited at
best, media are “bought off or bullied into self-censorship”, legislative
bodies become weak and ineffective, the judiciary becomes subordinate to the
executive, patriotism of the opposition is questioned and above all, a
demagogue ascends to the helm of power with the promise of applying simplistic
solutions to all the complex problems by himself/herself. These, in various
degrees, become the defining features of a polity and normalised with dubious
justifications.
The dire warning of the 1970s and 1980s that it
will be red-flag waving communists who will one day march to the capitals and
bring an end to democracy didn't come to pass, neither did the fear of the
1990s that the religio-political forces, often described as fundamentalists,
will succeed with their swords in executing democracy become a reality. It was
not the well-trained military who trampled democracy under their boots, a
familiar scene in the 1960s and the 1970s.
Of course, there are a few instances of all of
the above happening; in Venezuela democracy did erode under a leftist regime;
in Turkey and partly in India, democratic institutions and values have been and
are being shredded by parties who advocate religion-informed ideology; in
Thailand and Egypt the military has launched an assault against democracy. But,
in Europe, US, in various countries of Africa and Asia, it is the right-wing
populists, armed with a xenophobic and Islamophobic agenda under the veneer of
nationalism and apparently against economic marginalisation, who have become
the principal actors of this crusade against democracy, and thus far,
successfully.
Populist leaders come in different races,
colours and gender. They use various garbs. They are apt in constructing
enemies—domestic and foreign. For some the infamous “War on Terror” has
provided the justifications, for others economic development is the mantra.
They have created a pool of loyalists who are simultaneously proud (of their
nation and/or country and/or religion), disgruntled (about their economic and
political wellbeing) and angry (against a contrived enemy). They praise the
leader's outfit, even after the proverbial child has said, “the Emperor has no
clothes”.
Is there a specific moment that we can identify
as the pivotal moment, a moment when democracy breathes its last breath? There
was not a spectacular moment of the death of democracy anywhere in the world.
It was not announced in the media, a proclamation that “we are now abandoning
the principles of democracy or winding down democratic institutions” never
came. Instead, often that happened through a process essential to
democracy—elections. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt have aptly described
the process: “Democratic backsliding today begins at the ballot box. The
electoral road to breakdown is dangerously deceptive. With a classic coup
d'état, as in Pinochet's Chile, the death of a democracy is immediate and
evident to all. The presidential palace burns. The president is killed,
imprisoned or shipped off into exile. The constitution is suspended or
scrapped. On the electoral road, none of these things happen. There are no
tanks in the streets. Constitutions and other nominally democratic institutions
remain in place. People still vote. Elected autocrats maintain a veneer of
democracy while eviscerating its substance” (“This is How Democracies Die”, The
Guardian, January 21, 2018). What we see thereafter is, “despots masquerading
as democrats” and their loyalists continue to insist that democracy has been
saved and is flourishing.
While this is the epochal moment of the death of
a democracy, there are precursors, in politics and in society. In the social
arena, the progressive attenuation of empathy and tolerance, atomisation of
individuals, decline of virtuous social capital, apathy towards politics, and
continuous reproduction of differences are some of the precursors. In politics,
“the denigration of expertise and the celebration of ignorance; scorn for
consensus-builders and pragmatic compromise; the polarisation of politics
towards venom-spitting extremes” are the signposts of democracy's decline
(Andrew Rawnsley, “How Democracy Ends review—is people politics doomed?” The
Guardian, May 20, 2018). A combination of these social and political microbes
creates the malaise that kills democracy.
While there is very little disagreement about
the state we are in, how did we arrive here is the question for which we are
yet to find an answer. The most common response is that democratic institutions
have failed to deliver, and therefore, democracy as a normative value is now
under attack. Indeed, in the past decades both economic and political
inequality have grown within countries where democracy has been practiced, and
at the global level. There are reasons to be indignant towards the system.
Thanks to economic globalisation, new global elites have amassed wealth and
power, while a poorer class has been left behind. Politically, the institutions
which promised to be inclusive and represent the will of the many have given
power to a few and have become beholden to money, special interests and
influence. However, whether this provides a convincing explanation to this
phenomenon which is global in its scope but also has distinct particularity
depending on countries is a matter of debate. This we don't know yet.
Ali Riaz is a distinguished professor of
political science at the Illinois State University, USA.
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